

GERMANY

I. Status and Strength of the Communist Party

The East German Communist Party, called the Socialist Unity Party (SED), is an instrument of Soviet power and completely dominates all aspects of life in East Germany. Although it still maintains a facade of multiparty political life through the formal participation in the government of non-SED parties, these groups exercise no independent influence on policy; their leaders are tools of the SED.

The West German Communist Party (KPD) was outlawed by order of the Federal Constitutional Court on 17 August 1956. At that time it had only a limited influence in the politics and society of the Federal Republic and had long been recognized as simply an appendage of the East German Communist Party (SED) and as a proponent of Soviet rather than German interests. The scattered Communist influence in organized labor is limited to the coal mining, metallurgical, and shipbuilding industries; Communists are not represented in the leadership of any national trade union organization. The estimated strength of the KPD as of August 1956 was 50,000.

II. Party Units Responsible for Sabotage, Assassination, Ridnapping or Terrorist Missions

Communist militant action groups played a leadership role in the disorders in Berlin in 1948. Their activities were well planned, they knew where to go, what to do and they worked on a definite time schedule.

Communist directives which became available to German authorities in 1956 indicated that "Sonder-Aktivgruppen" (special groups) would be set up*, the members of which would not be

*Despite the functions outlined for these special groups, the terminology has not, in the past, meant "action" in the sense of militant or violent action. It will be noted that similar terminology is being used for some covert Party units in Algeria which have sabotage support functions.

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known to members of the regular plant groups. The special action groups were not to discuss their orders with anyone, not even the leaders of the regular plant groups. At a high-level conference of SED/KPD executives a secret directive was prepared according to which, for the preparation of "disruptive" activities, the "one-man system" was to be used. These specially-trained persons were to receive their orders from liaisen men from the Seviet Zone of Germany. Plant questionnaires which were sometimes issued by the Communist Party asking minute and detailed questions about plant activity were used to aid in determining the most favorable spots upon which to inflict sabotage.

III. Sabotage Training Given within West Germany

There is no evidence that West German Communists are being trained in West Germany for sabotage, except as noted in Section II, above.

IV. Sabotage Training Given West German Communists in Communist Bloc Countries

According to an unconfirmed report, the East German authorities were conducting courses in sabotage prior to Nevember 1950 for members of the West Zone's Communist Party and PDJ organization. Training centers were set up to accommodate the students by Laender. For instance, residents of North Rhine-Westphalia attended a school located in Landgemeinde Piesteritz (N52/E37), Saxony-Anhalt, while students living in Schleswig-Heistein were trained in Schwerin, Mecklenburg.

The Piesteritz school was housed in a former barracks which was part of the Piesteritz explosives factory property. Police officers lectured the students on the structure of roads, bridges, subways, railroad stations and other traffic installations, and demonstrated with models the technique of sabotaging such installations. Skilled persons from the East Zone railroad administration were brought in to instruct the students in



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how to block rail signals and cut cables. Special emphasis was placed on the method of putting signal installations out of order by twisting the wires together and on the quickest way to remove the cog wheels from signal boxes.

The best-known incidents of sabotage which took place in the years immediately following 1950 were directed against measures by Western Occupation forces to provide for the future mining of key bridges and road passes in the event of war. West German Communist organizations, especially the Communist youth organization, conducted a propaganda campaign against these measures and in some cases secretly organized groups (organizationally disclaimed) took action by pouring concrete into bridge damo-chambers, or by pushing construction equipment into creeks.

V. Sabetage, Assassination, Kidnapping, Terrorist Missions and Targets

a. U.S. and/or U.S. Allies Personnel, Installations

Although there were (particularly during the period of pressure against Berlin in 1948) numerous incidents of harassment and violence directed against British and U.S. personnel, there are no reports of sabotage in the strict sense of the term.

b. Other Sabotage Targets

In 1954 evidence became available to indicate that Communist activists, trained in sabotage, were being infiltrated into West Germany. Training was apparently on an individual basis. The target against which these saboteurs were to work was military production. This evidence has not been confirmed.

Daliberate damage to equipment and machinery of factories and of other production centers was carried out in 1956 in West Germany. A report of July 1956 related

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several instances of sabotage either in metallurgical plants or in mines of West Germany. In one factory oil pressure pipes of a moulding machine, a key element in the dis casting process, were forcibly removed. In the same plant, locks and instruments in new generator installations were repeatedly broken at short intervals. There was evidence in this case that members of the illegal Communist youth organization were implicated.

At a mine shaft installation foreign objects were thrown into the transmission gears of two conveyer belts, resulting in the less of 760 tons of coal. In this case there was evidence that the secretary of the local Communist Party district was ultimately responsible. Similar acts of sabotage occurred repeatedly at another mine; plant security officers believed they were perpetrated by an illegal Communist group which called itself the "Communist Party Youth Factory Group".

in most of these cases considerable danger to human life was involved. The offenders tried to make it appear that the incidents had occurred as the result of carelessness on the part of the plant managers so the latter could be accused of failure to take proper precautions against accidents.

Plant security officers considered all cases of sabotage carried out during this time to be a series of tests to discover the most productive areas for sabotage action in the event of a general disruption of the government of the Federal Republic and of its security machinery.

VI. Evidence of Direction and Support from the USSR, China or Other Communist Country

The Seviet occupation authorities assisted German Communists in every way possible in 1948 to advance the campaign to drive the Berlin City Assembly from its legal headquarters into the Western sector so it could then be declared illegal by the Soviet Military Administration. The Seviet Commandant refused to guarantee the safety of any

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future Assembly meetings held in the City Hall which was in the Seviet Sector. A Seviet order was issued that the City Assembly suspend all salary payments to city employees working in Western sectors of Berlin.

In the face of so much opposition from Soviet authorities and under the pressure of large mobs of Communist demonstrators, the City Assembly was forced to surrender the City Hall to the demonstrators on 6 September 1948. Western observers in Berlin at that time commented that although Communists lacked real popular support, their goals were reached thanks to the power and support of the Soviet Military Administration.

IX. Estimate of Threat from Local Communist Party Sabotage, Terrorism, etc.

The major threat of sabotage action in West Germany is derived from the potential abilities of agents of professional intelligence services of nearby Communist countries, especially sabotage action which may be organized jointly by RIS and the East German State Security.

An additional potential threat may exist if reports of 1956, so far unconfirmed, prove to be true that special groups were being formed among Communist elements in West German factories. These presumably would be activated in the event of an internal (West German) economic or political crisis, or in the event of outbreak of international hostilities. In view of centers of KPD strength, the most vulnerable points would probably be in the mines, the metallurgical and shipbuilding industries.